Proposition 13 and financial markets by anonymous
"Taxes," said Justice Holmes, "are the price
we pay for civilized society." If that be true,
Westerners were in a downright uncivilized
mood in 1978, because voters in five Western
states overwhelmingly adopted tax-or spending-
limitation measures during the year. Voters in
only one state (Oregon) rejected such a measure
where it appeared on the ballot, and that may
have been simply because two competing ballot
measures cancelled each other out.
The most widely publicized ofthese measures
was California's Proposition 13-the Jarvis-
Gann Initiative-which was designed to reduce
local property taxes 57 percent and to curb
future tax increases of either the state or local
variety. This $7-billion tax reduction amounted
to almost one-fifthofthetotal revenues raised by
all levels of California governments. Yet despite
widespread campaign rhetoric, Proposition 13
did not bring about a collapse of California
public services or public finance-nor did it
usher in the millenium. Nonetheless, the measure
did have important economic and financial con-
sequences, which are evaluated in two articles in
this issue of the Review. The third article anal-
yzes an important financial development of the
past decade-the rapid growth of the com-
mercial-paper market.
William H. Oakland cautions that the circum-
stances surrounding Proposition 13 were almost
unique to California. A major contributing fac-
tor to its success was a high and growing state-
local tax burden during a period when similar
burdens were levelling off in other states. A
second factor was a substantial shift in the
distribution of property-tax burdens towards
home-owners, at a time when inflation already
was causing budgetary problems for many
households. And a third factor was the emer-
gence of a massive California state-government
surplus in the period preceding the election.
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Oakland notes that Proposition 13 achieved
two of its three major objectives-property-tax
reduction and state-surplus liquidation. How-
ever, its initial impact on public-expenditure
growth was rather modest, largely because the
state government provided more than $4 billion
in direct assistance to local governments out of
its surplus funds. "In its first year, it required
only a 2.8 percent reduction in the average level
of public services; in the near future, barring a
major recession, it may have little effect unless
the state withholds the relief it can afford and
which it seems already committed to provide."
Proposition 13 thus emerges as a tax-reform
rather than anexpenditure-reductionmeasure-
one which shifts the emphasis from the property
tax to the income tax. Moreover, by shifting a
major portion of local revenue-raising responsi-
bility to the state, the amendment tends to erode
local control. (In view of recent court decisions,
this process would have occurred in any event
with respect to education.) And since the pro-
perty taxes that remain are shared on a county-
wide basis, the measure tends to augment the
resources of fiscally weak governments at the
expense of the more affluent.
Oakland emphasizes that the combination of
factors which gave rise to Proposition 13 is
unlikely to be matched in many other states-
and the same can be said of its consequences.
"The existence of a significant state surplus has
mitigated its potentially disruptive impact upon
the delivery of public services. This carries an
important lesson for other states that have !J,een
considering measures similar to Proposition 13.
Unless a considerable surplus already exists
somewhere in their state-local system, they can-
not expect to match the relatively smooth trans-
ition experienced by California."
Jack H. Beebe notes that Proposition 13, in
addition to restricting revenue sources, alsorestricts increases in the state's taxing powers---
and thereby blocks large increases in state taxes
as an alternative source of government revenue.
"Since such restrictions should affect the ability
of municipalities to service and retire debt,
Proposition 13's passage may adversely affect
both the cost of new issues and the value of
existing California municipal debt."
Beebe shows that Proposition 13 affects parti-
cular kinds of municipal debt in different ways
because of the specific wording of the amend-
ment. "For example, debt secured solely by
property-tax revenues is severely affected, while
other kinds of debt backed by general tax reve-
nues are affected less or not atall." Theprincipal
debt-market casualties appear to be redevelop-
ment agencies, the principal issuers of tax-
allocation issues, which have suffered an increase
in risk premium of at least 250 basis points
because of the financial market's reaction to
Proposition 13.
Beebe suggests, however, that restrictions on
the size ofgovernment need not increase thecost
of new debt or decrease the value of existing
debt. "Funds needed to payoffall existing debt
could be exempted from revenue ceilings (as was
voter-approved debt under Proposition 13),
thereby protecting all debt. Voters and govern-
ment officials may wish toconsidersuch alterna-
tives in structuring ways to restrict government."
The articles by Oakland and Beebe indicate
that notable changes have occurred to the state-
local fiscal structure in an era ofhigh inflation. A
third article in this issue, by John P. Judd,
analyzes an important change that has occurred
in the nation's financial markets in the past
decade's environment ofinflation and high inter-
est rates-the shift of a major portion of large
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corporate financing from large banks to the
commercial-paper market. This increased reli-
ance on direct finance through financial markets
goes against the typical postwar pattern, which
involves an increasing scope for financial in-
termediaries in channelingcredit. In Judd'sview,
"This development stems from the unavoidable
higher costs of bank as compared to paper-
market credit, as well as the relatively low value
of the intermediation 'services' which banks can
provide to commercial-paper borrowers."
Judd asks why large corporations did not
switch to the commercial-paper market at some
earlier date. "First, given the consistently low
interest rates of the 1950's and early 1960's, they
did not feel justified incurring the costs ofdeve-
loping and maintaining the staff expertise to
actively manage liquid assets and liabilities."
Corporations established a pattern of dealing
primarily with banks, even though deposit yields
were somewhat lower, and loan rates somewhat
higher, than those in the open-market. "Second,
even after interest rates began theirsecular rise in
the mid-1960's, corporate borrowers remained
uncertain about switching to the paper market,
because this meant departing from (and possibly
damaging) long-standing and difficult-to-
replace bank relationships."
Judd emphasizes that the greatly reduced
availability of bank credit in the credit
"crunches" of 1966 and 1969-70 created a new
financial environment. "Once having overcome
the obstacles to paper-market entry, eligible
firms became very responsive to relative costs in
deciding between alternative means of finance.
And since bank credit is almost unavoidably
more expensive than paper-market credit, the
switch to the latter market is not likely to be
reversed in the foreseeable future."